Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the Rationality of Theory-change :: Science Scientific Philosophy Essays

Lakatos and MacIntyre on Incommensurability and the Rationality of Theory-changeABSTRACT Imre Lakatos methodology of scientific research programs and Alasdair MacIntyres tradition-constituted enquiry are two preserve attempts to overcome the assumptions of logical empiricism, while saving the appearance that theory-change is rational. The key difference between them is their antithetical stand on the issue of incommensurability between large-scale theories. This leaving generates other areas of disagreement the most important are the relevance of the historical record and the presence of close criteria that are common to rival programs. I memorialise that Lakatos rejection of the incommensurability thesis and dismissal of actual history are motivated by the belief that neither are compatible with the rationality of theory-change. If MacIntyre can deny the demand of dispensing with the historical record, and show that incommensurability and the consequent absence of shared decisi on criteria are compatible with rationality in theory-change, then Lakatos argument leave behind lose its force, and MacIntyre will better honor the intention to take seriously the historicality of science. I argue that MacIntyre can dissolve tensions between incommensurability and rationality in theory-change if he is able, first, to distinguish a sense of the incommensurability thesis that preserves genuine rivalry between theories, and second, to show that the possibility of rationality in theory-change depends not on the presence of common decision criteria, precisely on the fact that traditions can fail by their own standards. After reconstructing and examining the argument, I conclude that the notion of a traditions internal failure is coherent, but that it leaves crucial questions about the epistemology and ontology of traditions that must be answered if MacIntyres proposal is to constitute a genuine improvement on Lakatos. Although he is not primarily a philosopher of scie nce, Alasdair MacIntyre has emaciated on post-Kuhnian methodological reflection in his formulation of an historicist theory of knowledge (1984a 271) or what his more recent work terms tradition-constituted inquiry (1988 354). In more respects, MacIntyres traditions are similar to the research programs described in the work of Imre Lakatos (1977). Both thinkers propose a shift in focus from atomic propositions to some display case of holism by making an entire theory, or series of theories, the proper object of evaluation. Each argues that the issues investigated by participants in research traditions are not unending questions, but are crucially shaped by their own problematics. Without devaluing consistency and logical rigor, each supposes that incoherence of a certain sort is the motor of clever progress.